Introduction
As part of an endeavour to explain the divergence in incomes per capita between North and South America, new institutional economics (NIE) and economic history have attempted in recent years to realize the potential effort for illumination derivable from comparisons of the heritage of colonial institutions. As developed by North and his school, these accounts of the institutional differences in the Americas are the offspring of similar (and we believe equally flawed) accounts for the divergence between Britain and the mainland of Europe. The latter was allegedly afflicted by institutions epitomized by their inefficiencies, compared with an entirely superior set of Anglo-Saxon institutions, which promoted and sustained Britain's successful trajectory to the First Industrial Revolution. Another view developed by a group of North American economic historians and economists prefers to emphasize the role of factor endowments as a foundation for both economic and institutional divergence between North and South America over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In origin, this literature argues that the conditions created by climate, topography, flora, fauna and soil condition growth through the relation between humans, nature and the disease environment.
2 Many authors, however, do not simply substitute factor endowments for institutions as the fundamental source of differential growth. Instead they argue that geography mattered, but only through its impact on institutions. 3 This approach has been applied to the divergence between North and South America. 4 However, the lines are often blurred between an explanation largely based on the exogenous variable geography, and one based on endogenous institutions shaped by geography. The argument tends to become either geographically determinist, as with Acemoglu et al., or underspecified in terms of causes and consequences, as with Gallup et al. The latter retreat into the tautological position that 'the connection between geography and development is ultimately driven by unobserved institutional factors that, for historical and other reasons, are correlated with geographical conditions '. 5 This article challenges the theoretical premises and historical evidence behind both the NIE and the factor endowment views, and offers a historicized explanation, both statistically and economically validated, for the institutional development and economic growth of Spanish America. The first section discusses the nature of Spanish imperial rule as mirrored in the colonial fiscal system. Intra-colonial revenue transfers in Spanish America, at the heart of our analysis in the second section, have attracted some scholarly attention from local and regional historians. However, there has been next to no analysis of their role when comparing different styles of imperial governance, despite the fact that this was an exceptional feature of Spanish imperialism. The final section explores how the operation of substantial interregional fiscal transfers within a colonial sphere, which was fiscally selfsufficient, fostered interregional conflict after the accidental collapse of Spanish rule. We believe that this contingency merits far closer analysis than has been accorded in recent path dependent institutional, or endowment based, explanations for South American retardation after independence.
The institutional explanation
It is now fashionable among North American economists and economic historians to see the history of Spain, and that of her empire, through the lenses of the history of Britain and the British Empire. Both mother countries emerged out of a late mediaeval phase of European state formation, and they created the two largest Western overseas empires. Both are credited with, or blamed for, institutional, political and social legacies, which characterized the state building and formation of institutions in the new nations that emerged from their colonial possessions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The economic and institutional paths that both empires followed could not have been more different, and these contrasts have led to the construction of metanarratives of the development of the Atlantic world since the sixteenth century. Spain is represented as absolutist, interventionist, centralist, statist, bureaucratic, and constitutionally disinclined to grant its subjects much local government, while extracting considerable revenues from them. England, or Britain, in contrast, is depicted as enjoying parliamentary government, treating colonies with benign neglect, granting them self-government, and rarely interfering in their internal affairs. Seemingly, these constitutional forms explain the very different economic performance of the successor states to these colonies, the modern USA and the Latin American republics that emerged between 1783 and 1825.
In an early article, contemporary to 'Constitutions and Commitment', North laid out the basis for comparative studies of Spanish and English colonies. He described 'a centralized monarchy in Castile [. . .] that defined the institutional evolution of both Spain and Latin America'. In his view, Spain relied on the extraction of state revenues from outside sources, be it from Naples, the Low Countries or the New World. Control over these revenues 'entailed a large and elaborate hierarchy of bureaucrats armed with an immense outpouring of royal edicts [. . .] designed to provide minute regulation of the economy'. 6 North also blamed the uniformity imposed by Spanish religion, governance and administration for Latin America's poor performance, which he contrasted with an English regime that supposedly allowed for diversity in the local political structure of its American colonies, only mildly regulated through the Navigation Acts. 7 All this allegedly flowed from Parliament's triumph over the monarchy in 1688, which constrained the Crown constitutionally, and created the legal and administrative environment in which the interests of commercial elites and the crown were aligned to generate long-run growth.
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Many historians of Spain and its Empire disagree with these Anglo-Saxon views. They consider the supposed absolutism of both Spain and its possessions overseas a caricature, and agree more readily with Halperín Donghi's assessment that even in its European core 'Absolutism was an aspiration rather than an effective political regime.'
9 Yet, economic historians' lack of attention to these more recent interpretations of the histories of Spain and its empire has contributed to the diffusion of an Anglo-Saxon paradigm of state and empire building. Moreover, the model has matured into a Whiggish historiography for a Washington consensus on optimal political, economic and cultural development for our own time. The real nature of Spain's political and social compact can be exposed when looking at the way in which political actors, individuals and corporations, bargained over how to finance the state and its military needs. The modes and location of such negotiations -legal challenges in the courts, debates in the king's councils and in the Cortes, or unruly riots in the main square -reveal much about where authority was located in this society. Historians have illuminated many aspects of a 'Spanish path to absolutism' through their studies of how decisions over fiscal exactions were made. Elsewhere we have complemented this with another angle of research that has received less attention, that is an analysis of the outcome of these negotiations in terms of the relative tax incidence borne by the different fiscal districts within Spain and the Spanish American possessions. This offers many insights into the nature of Spanish rule, differing greatly from the stylized interpretations of NIE textbooks.
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Textbook interpretations of the divergent economic paths of European colonies in North and South America over time are tightly focused on the legacy of colonial institutions for the post-independence period.
11 They draw upon a traditional political history of a continent marred by political divisions, endemic civil wars, despotic rule and serious disorder, which restrained the potential for growth in most national economies. In short, the new institutional explanation for Latin American economic backwardness is anchored in the political disorder and instability that occurred in the post-colonial period, which was in turn rooted in the failures of colonial institutions. This quotation captures a general view:
Widespread political instability and violence distinguish much of Latin America. While the US enjoyed an enduring set of political arrangements that both provided stability and protected markets from predation, most of Spanish America erupted in internecine war. Instability diverted resources from economic activity and channelled them into caudillo armies and a variety of praetorian efforts. Instability made it impossible to establish institutions that could bring the expected private returns rate from investment closer in line with social returns.
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North et al. certainly recognize that 'The Spanish Crown had long provided an important enforcement mechanism', and that, without it, political instability followed, which in turn increased uncertainty and raised transaction costs. But this kind of statement fails to resolve what post-independence political strife was about, and how it was linked to the disintegration of the imperial state, which led not only to political fragmentation, but also to the collapse of a fiscal and monetary regime that had underpinned economic activity in Spanish America for three centuries.
The factor endowments explanation
Engerman and Sokoloff's factor endowment model raises the question of the origins of differences in institutions. They shift the focus to the distinct resources which the British and Spanish acquired in the New World after 1500, and claimed that this led to different degrees of inequality, which persisted over time and affected the course of development through their impact on evolving institutions. 13 Differences in resource environments explain the intensity of extractive policies in European empires, the forced transportation of African slaves, disparities in human capital, and the relative success of colonial elites at securing and extending local political power. This analysis was from the outset criticized for the implicitly path-dependent nature of the argument, and it later evolved into an even more ambiguous response to the 'sins' of an original institutional set-up as the bedrock of all differences. The revised argument held that the availability of extractive resources, whether silver, land or labour, installed an unequal access to wealth and political leverage, which subsequently crystallized in Spanish America. By contrast, the British colonies, much less favoured in terms of valuable resources, engendered a more equal distribution of riches and power. The greater political leverage of elites in Spanish America was the source of marked inequality in wealth in today's Hispanic America. This contributed to the evolution of institutions that prolonged original inequalities in former Spanish colonies, and hence prevented the occurrence of intensive and sustained growth thereafter. Thus, Spanish colonial institutions protected 'the privileges of the elites and restricted opportunities for the broad mass of the population to participate fully -like in the post revolutionary US -in the commercial economy even after the abolition of slavery '. 14 There are several problems with this argument. For one thing, it is not clear how to characterize, let alone measure, the initial distributions of wealth, income and power if not by some institutional or technological (warfare) differences at the time of 'conquest'. This moves the argument closer to an institutionalist position than Engerman and Sokoloff would like. We, however, are more interested in the role ascribed to factor endowments as foundational for the evolution of institutions. Rights to land and labour, or to exploit mineral resources available in particular colonies, were at the root of conditions within and across colonies. 'The initial conditions had lingering effects, not only because certain fundamental characteristics of New World economies were difficult to change, but also because government policies and other institutions tended to reproduce them'. 15 For example, Engerman and Sokoloff maintain that suffrage was granted and extended earlier in North America than in Spanish America, where access to land ownership and public education was also unfavourable. 16 However, political historians point out that Spanish American republics relied, at least constitutionally, on a much wider franchise for men than their contemporaries elsewhere, abolishing legal distinctions between indigenous people and whites, and emancipating slaves from 1813. In fact, Spanish America enjoyed almost universal male suffrage very early on. The main differences with the US were that the right to be elected was often more restricted 
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than the right to elect in Spanish America, and that the turnout in elections remained much lower.
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Other authors, notably Acemoglu et al., have highlighted the extractive nature of the colonial bond and its detrimental effects. Though they insist that the persistence of colonial institutional differences is the root cause of subsequent differential development, they also argue that the non-feasibility of settlement in some regions, due to very high mortality rates, was the main reason why extractive institutions were created. 18 They support their theory rather poorly, with an outdated historical depiction of the institutions and resources of the Spanish empire. Paradoxically, institutionalists and factor endowment advocates share the assumption that some pre-existing ad hoc factor created an unequal distribution of resources or power, and therefore of income, or rents. In turn, this established different institutions, which made it impossible for post-colonial states in Latin America to grow and industrialize. 19 While providing an important corrective to the institutionalist approach, by stressing how differences in terms of population densities and raw materials have shaped institutional responses in the Americas, the emphasis on resource endowments still articulates with crude specifications of the institutional structure of Spanish colonialism.
Spanish American institutions
Historians of the Spanish Empire claim that the fiscal system of colonial Spanish America was more 'modern' than that in the metropolis. Colonial tax districts were typically not overlapping, institutional hierarchies centred clearly on a principal treasury office in each Audiencia, and there was less tax farming. 20 Yet, when setting up a fiscal system in the New World, Spanish officials imported an eclectic mixture of institutional precedents from various parts of the Hispanic monarchy, and had no grand new designs. The system was obviously less conditioned by historical exemptions than its European counterparts, but that did not automatically create a more modern fiscal system, in the sense of one that was more rationally bureaucratic, centralized, and based upon clear universal rules as to who had to pay what, where and when. In practice, the imperial fiscal system differed from Spain's, or Castile's, primarily because the labour and silver 'discovered' in America meant that the fiscal base expanded instead of contracting.
There was no single fiscal authority assessing and collecting a set of uniform and universally applied taxes in Spanish America. Instead there was a network of quasi-autonomous interdependent fiscal districts and authorities. At best, in the main administrative centres and ports, central treasuries collected revenues and monitored the accounts of lesser cajas. Fiscal administration changed and evolved over time, as cajas were created and closed according to the income they yielded. In the case of New Spain and the River Plate, local treasury networks were organically related to Mexico City and Buenos Aires, and most cajas were established in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. An integrated hierarchy of cajas in a vice-regal network was less clear in Peru and Upper Peru, where they mostly dated from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with some being closed by the 1780s.
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No single authority was responsible for the collection, assessment and management of revenues in Spanish America. Royal officials normally levied taxes, but the Church also collected some revenues for the Crown, and vice-versa, reflecting close links between ecclesiastical and temporal authority. 22 Although rules distinguished between Church and state revenues, variable systems of collection blurred the distinction. Officials assigned with specific tasks within each caja shared responsibilities for gathering and spending royal revenues, but the relation between them was often one of mutual distrust, conflicting standards and overlapping functions. 23 Officials were subjected to periodic inspections by the auditing bureau in the colony, or by specially appointed investigators. 24 The mission of the central authorities was to eliminate regional differences and standardize practices throughout the empire, but centralization of authority was more an aspiration than a reality.
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The fiscal bureaucracy looked sophisticated, and each caja nominally reported to the contaduria mayor of the Council of the Indies, but the Crown rarely had an accurate idea of how much revenue had been collected and spent. This was due to the extensive nature of local governance, time lags in reporting, and the existence of several intermediate levels for assessment and collection. Repeated reports, visits of envoys from Madrid, and the reiteration of royal orders can all be taken as a measure of the system's inefficiency. Yet, John Elliott has argued that 'the extraction of revenues from silver rich societies demanded a strong state structure in order to mobilize their extractive resources [. . .] and the deployment of an army of administrative, judicial and financial officials, whose activities (the Crown) carefully monitored.' 26 Nevertheless, throughout the colonial period outlays by the Crown for colonial administration were low. 27 Total sums spent on salaries represented just 3% of the total revenues of New Spain, 12% in sixteenth-century New Granada, and the same in Peru throughout 248 j j the period. Only in Charcas, Upper Peru, did expenditures on administration reach 40%, but they 'started to converge with Peru and Mexico in the last third of the eighteenth century'. 28 Charcas was the administrative centre of a large region, the site of the Audiencia and of several major public institutions, which explains its expenditure. Klein speculates that the low ratios in practically all other districts reflect the relative efficiency of the centralizing administration, but there is precious little evidence on local or regional degrees of efficiency. Nor would it appear that generalized coercion explains the low cost of administration. Instead the answer seems to lie in a development with peninsular Spanish precedents, namely the 'outsourcing' of important fiscal functions to private individuals, whose receipts never figured in public accounts. 29 The empire suppressed resistance and exerted control thanks to negotiation with its own officials and subjects, the co-option of its extended bureaucracy, and the increasing privatization of the management of royal funds. 30 This was effective in maintaining the status quo, but not very efficient, and it certainly countered any centralizing tendency.
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Uniformity in a tax system implies a single fiscal constituency, guaranteeing that there are no systematic differences in the treatment of tax payers, and similar tax rates for individual territories and particular activities. But Spanish America's subjects were divided into the repú blica de indios (indigenous population) and the repú blica de españ oles (Europeans). The coexistence of two distinct 'commonwealths' within a single geographical area created overlapping jurisdictions. There were early fiscal arrangements for indigenous communities, as Indian labour was a privilege granted to conquistadores and encomenderos. Effectively, indigenous communities traded tribute for guarantees of ownership of their communal lands. For long periods of time Indian traders were exempted from paying the important sales tax, the alcabala. Equally, the Catholic Church remained a separate but interdependent fiscal domain. Colonials were not equal before the Hacienda.
The nature of the alcabala also illustrates that there was no uniform tax rate. 32 Even after the alcabala was extended to the indigenous population, there were still different rates in different regions, and for different products. In the late eighteenth century, they ranged from 4% in Buenos Aires to 6% in both Perus, and 8% in Mexico (lowered to 6% in 1790). The effective burden has been estimated as 4-7% in Peru, and around 1.5-2.5% in Upper Peru, in the late eighteenth century. 33 There were also different kinds of alcabala (viento, mar, de Castilla, cabezó n) applicable in the same territory, varying according to the 
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origin of goods, or whether they came overland or by sea. In 1776 the alcabala was extended to staple foodstuffs, as well as to tobacco, sugar and local textiles in Peru. However, when in subsequent years the Crown tried to charge the tax on grain and maize, Indians in Upper Peru revolted. When the Crown suggested a higher rate for the same tax in New Granada, or changing the mode of collection, the reaction was similar. The history of tax revolts in Spanish America suggests that what alcabala really meant depended on the outcome of local negotiations between the crown and its American subjects.
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This all contrasts sharply with notions of a relatively modern fiscal administration at the service of a predatory, absolutist, all-powerful Spanish state. The Crown had no means to impose a uniform tax system on its colonial subjects. Instead a patchwork fiscal reality illustrates that Spanish imperial rule was to a surprising degree the result of negotiations between the crown, its own bureaucracy, and economic interests in the colonies.
Resources and revenues in the finances of Spain's empire in America
The clearest way to comprehend the fiscal nature of Spanish rule is to explore inferences obtained from data in the accounts of colonial treasury districts in what are today Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Herbert Klein and John TePaske collected these figures, out of which we have created two five-year samples. 35 No detailed data are available for the Caribbean, Philippines, Central America and part of New Granada (Venezuela and Colombia), but Tables 1 and 2 display the overall outlines of the colonial fiscal system. The total revenue raised in districts for which we have figures amounts to about 255 million pesos for the years 1785-89. A decade later royal revenue had increased to almost 420 million pesos in five years, and most of it emanated from the Viceroyalty of New Spain (Mexico). The US can serve as a useful point of comparison for Spanish colonial revenues, if we take into account that its population, about 5.3 million in 1800, was close to that of New Spain. Total US revenue for the period 1796-1800 was $43,363,000 compared to 338,000,000 pesos for New Spain, at a time when dollar and peso were practically at par. 36 Even if we assume that the fiscal burden in New Spain was considerably higher, an eightfold difference necessarily implies that per capita GDP in New Spain was much higher. In the late 1790s, even 'backward' Chile raised four times more revenue than the most populous state of the US, Pennsylvania.
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Spain certainly benefited from private remittances from the colonies, as well as taxes levied in the metropolis on trade with the colonies. In the late eighteenth century the contribution that the Spanish Hacienda derived from the Americas, including direct contributions, monopolies and trade taxes, was about 20% of total metropolitan revenue. 38 But direct transfers to the motherland of fiscal receipts levied in the colonies looked modest compared to intra-colonial transfers, that is payments flowing between treasury districts within Spanish America (including the Philippines). Column 4 of Tables 1 and 2 illustrates the degree to which Spanish colonial rule shifted financial resources around different regions in the empire. The values represent the balance of incoming and outgoing intra-colonial transfers for each macro administrative region. Up to 45% of the revenue raised in colonial Spanish cajas in the late eighteenth century was not spent within the same district. Our tables illustrate three basic features of Spanish imperialism. Firstly, they show Spanish America's global significance as a source of bullion for the world economy, for revenues in 1785-89 alone were nearly equal to the total silver imports through Canton 37 Samuel Hazard, ed., The register of Pennsylvania. Devoted to the preservation of facts and documents, and every other kind of useful information respecting the State of Pennsylvania, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, January to July 1828), pp. 9-12. Note: net payments will not add up to zero, since important recipient regions, especially New Granada, Cuba and the Philippines are missing. 
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from 1719 to 1833. 39 Secondly, the figures illustrate Spanish imperialism's redistributive features, of which fiscal remittances to the metropolis by the end of the eighteenth century were only a small proportion. Redistribution within the colonies was far larger. As TePaske has pointed out, the retention rate of royal revenue within the colonies began to increase very early on. In the 1590s about 64% of the revenue collected by Lima was transhipped to Spain, but from the 1660s this never exceeded 10%. The picture for Mexico was comparable. 40 Thirdly, transfers between regional districts seem to have been crucial for the governance of the empire, and this feature of Spanish colonialism contrasted strongly with the fiscal system operating in the British American colonies. The pattern of redistribution between the larger regions is similar between 1785 and 1800. Revenues assessed and collected in New Spain flowed via Havana to colonial frontiers, such as Louisiana, Florida, northern Mexico and California, or they were channelled via the famous Manila Galleon to the Philippines. 41 Direct data for the Caribbean are few and far between, but we know that Cartagena de Indias received a total of 2,348,929 pesos in situados (subsidies) in our first sample period, and 2,194,629 pesos in our second one.
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The Philippines received 1,144,138 pesos in 1791-95, and 4,341,623 pesos in 1796-1800. During the following two five-year periods these fell to 1.8-1.9 million pesos. 43 The best number for the monies actually received in Cuba as situados is de la Sagra's account of 68,641,605 pesos in 1788-1804, or about 4 million per year. 44 Within South America, Lima, Chile and, above all, the Rio de la Plata were net beneficiaries of transfers. An even more complex picture is revealed by disaggregating to the level of 54 individual cajas (see Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 2). Seventeen cajas gained from net transfers, and for seven these transfers were the main source of revenue in 1785-89. Ten years later (1796-1800), 19 out of 54 treasuries were subsidized, and one in four depended on transfers for the largest share of their resources. Only a small number of cajas received and paid out about the same amount, or did not transfer or receive any money at all, and these were mostly fiscally unimportant districts. The story is even more complex on a yearly basis, as a substantial number of districts were net recipients in some years, but net payers in others. 44 These are likely to be substantially lower than the ones dispatched from New Spain. They include situados y factoria tobacco. Ramon de la Sagra, Historia econó mica, política y estadística de la isla de Cuba o sea de sus progresos en la població n, la agricultura, el comercio y las rentas Habana: Imprenta de las Viudas de Arazoza y Soler, impresoras del gobierno y capitania general, de la Real Hacienda y de la Real Sociedad Patriotica por S.M., 1831.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the spatial distribution for Mexico and the two Perus of net payers (dark grey), net recipients (light grey), and zero net transfers (very light grey) in our later sample. Actual borders between treasury districts within the same intendencia are not known, and are thus represented approximately. Our figures qualify both the motivation most often named as the origin of the transfer system, that is defence needs, and the exploitation of mining and labour resources as the key feature on the revenue side. Coastal areas clearly played a large part in the defence of the empire, but so did areas bordering hostile neighbours such as the north of Mexico, Chile or regions close to Portuguese territory, like Paraguay. Not all military outposts were on the coast, nor were all coastal areas important military outposts. Lima, and its port Callao, illustrate the latter point. Our figures thus suggest that military need was only one of several factors behind intra-colonial transfers. If the standard notion of intra-colonial transfers as a simple means to fund defence was true, we should be able to identify a strong statistical association between large positive transfers and defence spending. Equally, if gaining revenues from extractive sectors was a key element of Spanish rule, there should be a strong negative correlation between fiscal revenue derived from mining and agriculture and inter-caja transfers, that is an outflow of revenue from mining and agricultural regions. Finally, districts that organized shipments to Spain should exhibit higher positive intra-colonial transfers.
TePaske and Klein's data allow us to investigate the sources of revenue and destinations of expenditure for individual cajas for our two sample periods, and to reclassify them into broad categories. (See Appendix 1) On the revenue side we distinguish between taxes levied on mining, agriculture, trade and consumption, and the church. The guiding principle of our sectoral classification was the incidence of taxation, or which sector of the economy was affected by particular taxes. Income from monopolies has been assigned to the relevant sectors, and we combine taxes on labour and production under the same heading, as long as they were borne by the same sector. 45 We exclude a number of administrative taxes, such as stamped paper, since it is not clear on what sectors they fell, but our categories still cover a high percentage of total income. The category 'church' picks up taxes that were the property of the Crown but were collected by the Church, as well as income that the state derived from confiscated Jesuit properties. On the debit side of these reconstructed accounts, we have separated military spending and transfers to Spain. Our purpose is not to analyse the performance of the economy, but that of the state. Several authors have rightly questioned the suitability of fiscal receipts as economic proxies, but we do not claim that the tax burden on individual sectors reflects the composition of the real economy very closely. Our data set merely allows us to investigate relationships between particular sources of revenue and patterns of expenditure on the one hand, and net intracolonial transfers on the other. Table 5 reports results of a simple OLS regression model investigating the strength of the relationship for the two sample periods. We report results respectively for each period, introducing as independent variables the revenue derived from mining, trade and consumption, agriculture and the Church, as well as military expenditure. We add a dummy variable for large seaports, the points at which the silver economy met with international trade, to investigate whether treasury districts centred on ports were more or less likely to receive intra-colonial transfers.
Regression 1 for the period 1785-89 shows that a higher share of revenue derived from mining was strongly associated with lower net transfers, but the coefficient is rather small. In fact, it seems that agricultural districts were punished by the redistribution of revenues, with an additional peso derived from agricultural taxes being associated with 0.8 pesos less in net transfers, twice the rate for either mining or trade. The fact that all revenue categories have negative signs in the first period appears counterintuitive, but net recipients are under-represented, because we have no data for several areas. For our purposes, it is more important that we represent net payers correctly, and our sample includes the most populated areas, and all silver mining areas. The size of individual coefficients might be affected by the sample bias, but we are confident that the ranking between independent variables with regard to the likelihood of paying more into the transfer system is robust. To the extent that there was an extractive element, districts highly dependent on agriculture received low or negative transfers, whereas mining districts fared better. The modest contribution of Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level.
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mining in our results seems to be in line with Mahoney's research, which found that the presence of silver mining in a region did not determine the institutional legacy in significant ways. 46 More significantly, it questions the 'factor endowment' literature.
The relatively high negative coefficient for Church revenue is surprising. Income derived from the Church was generally higher in major administrative centres, which we might have expected to receive large net transfers. A look at the raw data suggests that, in the earlier period, this variable was driven by exceptionally large income from the sale of Jesuit properties after their expulsion. Thus, we would not put too much weight on this result. Districts with high military spending received net transfers, though this variable was not driving the story as strongly as the historiography suggests. A peso of additional military spending in peace time was associated with an extra 0.4 pesos of net transfers. Neither mining, nor military needs, nor transfers to Spain determined the results to the extent that the traditional story would make us believe.
The really striking result is that maritime ports received huge net transfers, about 350,000 pesos on average, when the average net income of cajas in this period was about 770,000 pesos, albeit with tremendous variations. Moreover, it seems that ports attracted intra-colonial transfers essentially due to their commercial role. These results also hold true if we include, as an additional variable, transfers to the metropolis in regression 2. Those districts that transferred funds to Spain received smaller net intracolonial transfers. The coefficient is not large, but it illustrates that the system of intracolonial transfers functioned largely independently of transfers to Spain, which were not a pivotal part of the redistribution of resources. Instead the fiscal system in Spanish America evolved around a system of distribution of funds between and within colonial macroregions, causing some substantial geographical splits between regions of collection and expenditure.
By the late 1790s the fallout from the European wars was increasingly felt in the colonies. Local defence spending increased as colonies came under threat, and intra-regional transfers increased. 47 Overall fiscal pressure intensified, and net transfers were channelled more directly into areas responsible for military and naval expenditures, as the results of regressions 3 and 4 illustrate. Pressure for extra revenues to fund higher expenditures on defence was not seemingly intensified for mining and agriculture, or for major administrative centres. Extra burdens in wartime fell on domestic trade and consumption, whereas ports escaped with minor reductions in net transfers. What emerges here is not the standard story of an extractive economy. Net flows of transfers had previously been quite evenly distributed between regions deriving their revenues from different sectors, though unevenly distributed geographically. Now, revenue from trade and consumption, especially internal commerce, became strongly associated with net outflows of transfers. Revenue derived from agriculture and mining ceased to be statistically associated with the flow of net transfers. In an allegedly extractive economy, ruled by an absolutist and predatory state, the main source of revenues was thus trade and consumption in the domestic economy. To be sure, Latin American historians have stressed the significance of domestic trade in the colonial economy, following Sempat Assadourian's seminal contribution. 48 However, many economic historians continue to overlook the scope and strength of non-metal production and internal commerce. Overall then, our regressions suggest significant modifications to the traditional picture of Spanish rule. In peace time, we can all but reject the hypothesis of a system geared towards extracting revenue from mining and channelling it to Spain. There is a little evidence for agriculture being subject to such 'extractive' pressure, and that revenue was targeted at defence, but neither is sufficient to explain the net transfer system entirely. In time of war, the defence hypothesis receives more support from our results, but the 'extraction' hypothesis has to be even more strongly challenged.
To assess the role of mining for the overall collection of revenue, it is also instructive to consider a few treasury districts, listed in Table 6 , where mining was the predominant sector. By the late 1790s, such districts received about 50% of their receipts, excluding intracolonial transfers, from mining, down from 58% ten years earlier. Mining districts stimulated agricultural production over wide areas, to supply workers and towns. In a number of cases, the share of taxes levied on agriculture was close to, or even higher, than taxes collected directly from mining. Trade and consumption contributed a large share of income in many cases. In fact, the 8% fall in the relative share of revenue derived from mining between the late 1780s and the late 1790s was accompanied by a corresponding rise in the share of income from the second largest sector, trade and consumption in most cases, and agriculture in a few cases. By the late 1790s, the second sector contributed on average more than 30% to the total non-transfer income of these mining centres. In San Luis Potosí, New Spain, trade even contributed as much as mining. In a period of increased fiscal pressure, the share of non-mining income increased considerably, suggesting a shift in relative burden. We see clear evidence that the largest sector in these mining areas was paying a smaller proportion of total tax revenue over time. The relative decline in mining taxes was clearly not driven by a decline in the availability of mercury or mining itself, which was very prosperous at this time. 49 Since we have no way of knowing how large each sector was in any of the individual districts, we can only offer conjectures. Yet, our sample of mining towns casts doubt over the assumption that the contribution that each sector made to total income was strongly correlated to its share of the local economy. For example, by the late eighteenth century Buenos Aires was maturing into a major maritime city. Yet, of the taxes collected for the district, only 3-4% of the total came from trade and consumption. This qualifies representations of a fiscal system servicing the needs of the metropolis. Our data set and analysis suggest a system marked by negotiations over taxes between social elites and the metropolis. 50 An alignment in fiscal policy between the interests of elites and Crown is the key to understanding how the empire survived as a single political unit for 300 years, in the face of the superior military power of its rivals. The data presented above are consistent with this perception. Powerful mining elites in the silver districts, and mercantile elites in commercial centres, knew how to avert and avoid impositions on their economic activities. When demands for revenue increased, the burden was diverted to softer targets, such as trade and consumption, or agriculture around mining towns. Most of the small settlements in the interior were organized around the local production of foodstuffs, services and some manufactured goods for urban or mining centres, obtaining much income from the intermediation of imported goods and locally produced commodities. Here, local interests were often too weak to resist taxation. By contrast, commercial elites in maritime cities kept their taxes low, to foster trade. More trade made commercial elites more powerful and resourceful in their defence of commercial and fiscal privileges, so that transfers from less advantaged regions picked up the tab not only for defence but also for much of civil administration.
Transfers augmented supplies of money and credit in port cities like Buenos Aires, Havana, or Cartagena. The latter received about 17 million pesos from interior regions in New Granada from 1776 to 1810, roughly 25 pesos per capita for the whole district population, or 119 pesos extra for every inhabitant of the port. For Cuba the economic effects of transfers were even more spectacular. The free population of the island had increased by 46% between 1774 and 1792, while the slave population doubled. Meanwhile in Buenos Aires and Havana, yields from customs increased ten times from 1778 to 1803-05.
51 This is a low estimate, since contraband was the norm. 
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The parallel performance of colonies with such different factor endowments and sets of property rights was extraordinary. There was abundant free land and scarce but mainly free labour in the remote River Plate, while the Caribbean island specialized in intensive production of sugar with slave labour. John Coatsworth has explained their rate of growth, superior to other Spanish American settlements, in terms of their openness to overseas trade. 52 Apart from the inclusion of re-exports in the index of openness, this neo-institutional explanation fails to mention that both economies were net recipients of transfers of revenues in silver from distant regions. Additional liquidity fostered trade, improved the purchasing power of exports, and provided subsidies for consumers.
The overall scale of additional resources pumped into a few areas by way of redistribution of revenues within the empire has been measured for districts for which population data are available. Per capita figures in Table 7 
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how much purchasing power in the receiving districts increased, it is useful to put them in the context of contemporary spending power. Brown calculates that the annual spending of a Spanish family in Arequipa, Peru, was about 260 pesos in 1780, and 240 pesos in 1800. For a mestizo family, he assumes 160 and 130 pesos respectively. 53 Transfers of 20 pesos or more per annum to places like Havana, Buenos Aires and Cartagena enriched and empowered elites in both sending and receiving region because the management of transfers remained in the hands of mercantile groups, who used public funds to finance trade and gain from arbitrage and commissions. 54 For example, Potosí merchants took the annual situado to the port of Buenos Aires to finance their purchase of imported goods.
Merchants from Mexico City took revenues to Havana, paying themselves for military supplies and other goods that they transported to that city. These man-made inequalities in the fiscal system substantially altered the spatial availability of resources for investment and consumption, in accordance with the changing rhythm of global trade. Thus, there was a relative reduction in transfers to Lima (sent forward to Panama, Acapulco and the Pacific), in favour of remittances to Buenos Aires in the South Atlantic (whence silver reached China and the East Indies). 55 The system of fiscal redistribution between treasury districts served its purpose from the point of view of the Spanish empire. It funded military defence, kept the empire self-sufficient, aligned local elites' interests with those of the Crown by fostering economic growth, and made different parts of the colonies dependent on one another.
Imperial implosion
Then disaster struck, in the person of a Corsican. In May 1808, Napoleon took the Spanish king as prisoner, placed his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain, and demanded the continuation of silver transfers as before. This opened a crisis of legitimacy and governance that would eventually end the ancien régime in Spain and destroy the empire. 56 This crisis aggravated the conflict between a financially impaired Crown and increasingly powerful local oligarchies over a redefinition of the imperial bond at a time when the colonial society had reached a point of maturity and the continuation of the social order was being challenged. Spanish American elites only 'needed a favourable conjuncture in which to seize the initiative' and Napoleon's invasion of Spain proved to be the catalyst for the revolution and the emergence of Latin American republics. 57 The collapse of central government in America 260 j j mirrored a similar sequel of 'coups, countercoups, civil wars, restorations and constitutional experiments' in nineteenth-century Spain. 58 The distinct path that the Portuguese empire followed, in similar circumstances, has been taken as confirmation of interpretations of Spanish American independence. 59 The process has been widely studied by political and economic historians. 60 However, 'the reasons for the fragmentation of Latin America are still not quite evident'. 61 Historians have pointed at pre-existing ethnic and regional identities, competing interests between colonies and metropolis, and the multiplication of rivalries among regions with an increasing sense of nationality and very different economic assets to participate in the Atlantic economy. Our discussion offers a supplementary explanation. With the deposition of the king and the impossibility of restoring legitimacy to a central government, the ultimate arbiter for the system of revenue redistribution between colonial districts failed. The empire imploded, fiscal redistribution ceased to function and strife over controlling revenues and mint houses followed. The result was an immediate process of increasing territorial, fiscal and political disaggregation. The Empire broke up into modern republics along the lines of the colonial treasury boundaries.
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Political fragmentation and the disintegration of the fiscal system were intimately connected. 'Beggar-thy-neighbour' strategies flowed from the collapse of an integrated imperial fiscal structure. Regional elites seized colonial revenues immediately, to defend their political and economic interests, and later to define the boundaries of new republican states. Called upon to fund either patriot or royalist armies, those local treasuries that had depended upon transfers fell into serious disarray. Fiscal revenues and mints fell into the hands of new local authorities or the 'private sector', and broke free of all traditional obligations to the empire. Disorder and civil war were unavoidable when new governments appeared at former colonial tax districts. Without a legitimate distributor responsible for revenues in Spanish America, districts became fiscally and politically autonomous units, even if some remained bound to each other in loosely defined constitutional states. More often, they engaged in competition for revenues and resources, which characterized the continuous warfare of nineteenth-century Latin America. 63 Thus, it could be argued that the malign legacy of Spanish imperial rule in America was not due primarily to its absolutist nature. Rather a unique system of internal redistribution of revenues created strong centrifugal tendencies in the absence of the ultimate and legitimate arbiter, the king according to Spanish constitutional tradition. 64 In North America a new nation state emerged out of the aggregation of quasi-autonomous, self-governed, fiscally independent colonies. In Spanish America an operational unified political and economic empire collapsed into a large number of poorly defined and legitimated nation states. The Spanish path to the formation of an empire turned out to be a poor basis for state formation and institution building in the post-independence period.
Conclusion
We started this paper with a discussion of the merits and flaws of a now very extensive literature that compares former Spanish and British colonies in order to identify the conditions that favour -or hinder -economic growth in the longer run. As Engerman and Sokoloff point out, the Americas are in some senses a natural experiment that can enlighten many of the larger issues of long-term growth. We argued that, broadly, two approaches have developed. One sees the origins of North American success and Latin American failure in the institutions that were introduced by the respective colonial overlords. The other is more deterministic and sees the root of differential development in the natural endowments that European colonizers found in their newly conquered territories. These, it is argued, created a much greater degree of inequality in the Spanish hemisphere, which became enshrined in the institutional set-up of these colonies and their successor states, and thus perpetuated itself. The insitutionalist approach claims that Spain's predatory absolutist state forced the colonies into an economic model based on the exploitation of natural resources and indigenous or imported servile labour. This in turn created an economy rife with rent-seeking, which stifled investment and production, and in the longer term seriously constrained Latin America's growth potential. We confront this claim with the reality of the structure of the fiscal system in Spanish America, arguing that the colonies were in fact surprisingly autonomous. The tax system in the colonies depended to a very large degree on local and regional decision-making, so that the relationship between Crown and elites was one of negotiation, not of command. This shows more clearly than any other indicator that Spanish colonial rule was not as absolutist, bureaucratic and extractive as has been argued.
The factor endowment approach returns to economic fundamentals, namely the availability of land, labour and raw materials. Here it is argued that Spanish colonies, blessed with large amounts of silver and labour, featured a very unequal income distribution from the very beginning as a consequence of the concentrated control over these valuable resources. Over the course of 300 years of colonial rule this unequal distribution became enshrined in the political and social institutions of the colonies, reducing investment and ultimately damaging growth. Factor endowments obviously provided for great differences in the economic potential of Spanish colonial districts. However, we argue that a fiscal analysis shows that we can understand their impact only if we understand the nature of Spanish rule, which has been inaccurately characterized.
We suggest that this was not a system primarily aimed at the extraction of resources or revenues from the colonies for the benefit of the metropolis. Instead it successfully aimed at making the colonies self-sufficient, with intra-colonial transfers covering the needs of regions that either could not or would not raise sufficient revenue. This enabled Spanish rule to expand into unsettled territories from the Californias to Patagonia, with presence and commerce in both oceans. The empire could defend itself against enemies that were militarily superior by the late seventeenth century, while achieving a reasonable rate of economic growth. The political economy foundations of this system were negotiated rule, aligning interests between local elites and the Crown, with the king as the crucial accepted ultimate arbiter.
The system was thus thrown into disarray by the imprisonment of the Spanish king at the hands of Napoleon. Conflict between districts that had depended on transfers and those that had been net payers became unavoidable. The unequal distribution of the tax burden, in regional and sectoral terms, became apparent when each new polity located in the old fiscal districts scrambled for the means to carry on. This suggests that fiscal causes drove much of the political and military conflict that plagued Latin America after independence.
Ultimately, our reading of the fiscal and political history of the late colonial and early post-colonial phase in Latin America puts the importance of contingency back centre stage. The complex fiscal system of cross-subsidization of treasury districts in colonial Spanish America owed much both to resource endowments and to the negotiated character of Spanish rule. In the end, it was a chance event, the imprisonment of the legitimate king, which created a political vacuum that brought the whole system down. Because regions had depended on one another this was the one shock that the system could not withstand. Interregional war and territorial fragmentation destroyed the West's largest customs and monetary union, at great economic cost. 65 Indirectly, we could blame Spanish institutions, but only insofar as they created a system that was successful as long as the legitimate ruler remained uncontested.
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individual districts in earlier periods than in later ones. For our samples, the relatively few missing observations are generally not for major treasury districts.
The choice of time periods was based on considerations of quality of data and historical events. An earlier sample would have been desirable, but survival of the data was such that the consistency of the results would have been suspect. Both periods 1785-89 and 1796-1800 are a number of years after the uprisings in Upper Peru that seriously affected tax collection. They cover the period of the major impact of Bourbon Reforms, and are prior to the conflicts that led to independence. The second sample reflects increasing pressures for revenue in a period of war.
We first tried to determine net incomes and net expenditure for each caja and each year, subtracting all entries that related to carry-overs and deposits from our net totals. We then reclassified every item for each caja to analyse the composition. On the income side the overriding principle was one of tax incidence, under the categories transfers, transfers to Spain, mining, agriculture, trade and consumption, and Church. Our category 'transfers' only includes payments from (income side) or to (expenditure side) other treasury districts in the colonies, not those from or to Spain. At times the destination or source treasury of transfers is clearly identified, but often it is just registered as going to or coming from other districts. Thus it is impossible closely to follow the money trail through the districts. In most cases our categories comprised more than 85% of income. On the expenditure side we identified transfers within America, transfers to Spain, and military expenditure. Overall, this process produced a data set with about 270 observations for each five-year period.
